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Are There Levels
of Consciousness?
Tim Bayne,1,2,* Jakob Hohwy,3 and Adrian M. Owen4
The notion of a level of consciousness is a key construct in the science of
consciousness. Not only is the term employed to describe the global states of
consciousness that are associated with post-comatose disorders, epileptic
absence seizures, anaesthesia, and sleep, it plays an increasingly inﬂuential
role in theoretical and methodological contexts. However, it is far from clear
what precisely a level of consciousness is supposed to be. This paper argues
that the levels-based framework for conceptualizing global states of conscious-
ness is untenable and develops in its place a multidimensional account of global
states.
Two Aspects of Consciousness
Consciousness is typically taken to have two aspects: local states (see Glossary) and global
states. Local states of consciousness include perceptual experiences of various kinds, imagery
experiences, bodily sensations, affective experiences, and occurrent thoughts. In the science of
consciousness local states are usually referred to as ‘conscious contents’, for they are
typically distinguished from each other on the basis of the objects and features that they
represent. By contrast, global states of consciousness are not typically distinguished from
each other on the basis of the objects or features that are represented in experience. Instead,
they are typically distinguished from each other on cognitive, behavioural, and physiological
grounds. For example, the global state associated with alert wakefulness is distinguished from
the global states that are associated with post-comatose conditions such as the vegetative state
(VS) and the minimally conscious state (MCS), and these states are themselves distinguished
from the states that are associated with light-to-moderate degrees of sedation, dreaming,
hypnosis, and epileptic absence seizures.
Compared with the amount of attention that has been devoted to the contents of conscious-
ness, global states of consciousness have been relatively neglected (although see [1–6]). This
neglect might be justiﬁed if the notion played only a marginal role in the science of conscious-
ness, but it is puzzling given the increasing prominence of global states in consciousness
studies. The neglect of global states might also be justiﬁed if their nature was self-evident, but
that is not the case either. Indeed, the standard conception of global states equates them with
‘levels of consciousness’, but it is far from clear what a level of consciousness is supposed to be.
This paper argues that the levels-based conceptions of global states of consciousness is
untenable, and offers in its place a multidimensional analysis of global states.
Levels of Consciousness
The term ‘levels of consciousness’ derives from the clinical literature on disorders of conscious-
ness, where it was introduced in connection with the disorders of consciousness that occur
following coma, such as the VS [7]. With the introduction of the category of the MCS in 2002 [8],
clinicians now operate with a taxonomy of global states of consciousness that are taken to
be scalable along a single dimension: MCS patients have a higher level of consciousness than
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VS patients do, and emerged from minimally conscious state (EMCS) patients in turn have a
higher level of consciousness than MCS patients. (The recent distinction between MCS+ and
MCS– patients introduces a further level of consciousness within the MCS category [9]).
Over the past decade the notion of a conscious level has been extended beyond the post-
comatose disorders of consciousness, and is now routinely applied to the global states of
consciousness associated with sedation [10–12], sleep [10,13], and epileptic absence seizures
[14–16]. Indeed, the term has even been applied to consciousness as it occurs in human infancy
and non-human animals [17], with the suggestion that infants and non-human animals have
lower levels of consciousness than neurotypical adult human beings (Box 1).
We grant that many global states of consciousness can be ordered in a rough and ready
manner, and that appeals to the notion of a level of consciousness has a certain utility in clinical
contexts. However, the notion of a level of consciousness is no longer employed as a merely
informal device, but has become a key theoretical construct in the science of consciousness.
The integration of a clinical understanding of levels with theoretical approaches to conscious-
ness is exempliﬁed by a recently developed measure of consciousness, the perturbational
complexity index (PCI), which is explicitly presented as a measure of levels of consciousness
([18], see also [19]). The PCI is inspired by one of the major theories of consciousness, the
Integrated Information Theory, which is expressly designed to explain the ‘classic distinction
between level and content of consciousness’ [20].
We think that the science of consciousness has been overly hasty in employing the notion of a
conscious level as a central theoretical construct. Although global states of consciousness
clearly exist, there are serious – and perhaps even fatal – problems with treating such states as
involving changes in a level of consciousness. If the notion of a level of consciousness has no
sound basis, then it is unclear whether even highly sophisticated attempts to measure it or
develop theories of it will be successful.
Levels as Degrees of Consciousness
To describe global states as levels of consciousness is to imply that consciousness comes in
degrees, and that changes in a creature's global state of consciousness can be represented as
changes along a single dimension of analysis. This idea is frequently expressed in consciousness
science. For example, consciousness is described as involving ‘a scale ranging from total
unconsciousness (e.g., death and coma) to vivid wakefulness’ [21]; as a ‘continuous variable’
[22]; and as ‘being graded’ rather than being an ‘all-or-none property’ [23]. Are these claims
plausible? Can individuals be ordered on the basis of how conscious they are, just as they can be
ordered on the basis of their age, height, or blood pressure?
Glossary
Conscious contents: the features of
consciousness that account for its
subjective or phenomenal character,
such as experiences of pitch or of
motion. Paradigmatic contents are
sensory, but many theorists think that
non-sensory states of various kinds
(such as thoughts) can also
contribute to the contents of
consciousness.
Consuming system: a system (e.g.,
attention or working memory) that
employs the contents of
consciousness in the service of some
cognitive or behavioural goal.
Emerged from minimally
conscious state: a post-comatose
state that is characterised by the
capacity to engage in functional
communication or use objects
appropriately.
Global availability: contents are
globally available when they can be
used to guide a wide variety of
cognitive and behavioural processes,
such as verbal report, reasoning,
inhibitory control, and memory
consolidation. The notion is closely
related to the notion of ‘access
consciousness’ and ‘cognitive
accessibility’.
Global states of consciousness:
states of consciousness that
characterise an organism's overall
conscious condition. An organism
can be in only one global state of
consciousness at a time. Not to be
confused with global availability.
Local states of consciousness: to
be contrasted with global states of
consciousness. Local states of
consciousness are individuated in
terms of their contents or
phenomenal character.
Box 1. Infants and Animals
A number of theorists have used the term ‘levels’ in connection with consciousness in infants and non-human animals,
suggesting that infant and animal consciousness involves low levels of consciousness (e.g., [4,17]). The analysis of levels
presented here problematises such claims, for although there may be conscious contents and capacities that infants and
non-human animals fail to share with ‘us’, infants and non-human animals can also have conscious contents and
capacities that adult human beings lack. Dogs can detect odours that we cannot [42], and young children experience less
sensory integration than adults and are thus better able to exploit information in individual sensory modalities [43]. The
restrictions in content and cognitive/behavioural capacities that is captured by appeal to the notion of a global state of
consciousness needs to be understood in relation to the organism's ordinary capacities. A mouse that cannot report its
perceptual experiences does not thereby have an abnormal global state of consciousness, whereas a human being who
cannot report her perceptual experiences because she is undergoing an absence seizure does. Non-human animals and
infants can of course have non-standard global states of consciousness for the same kinds of reasons that human adults
can (e.g., sedation, epileptic seizures), but there is no reason to suppose that the global states of consciousness had by
infants and non-human animals when they are alert and awake are distinct from those had by neurotypical adult humans.
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We think not. There are two problems with this proposal. The ﬁrst problem is conceptual: the
notion of degrees of consciousness is of dubious coherence. According to the standard
conception of consciousness, a creature is conscious if and only if it possesses a subjective
point of view [24]. Arguably, the property of having a subjective point of view is not gradable–it
cannot come in degrees. In this way it resembles being a member of the United Nations rather
than being healthy, which clearly can come in degrees. One person can be conscious of more
objects and properties than another person, but to be conscious of more is not to be more
conscious. A sighted person might be conscious of more than someone who is blind, but they
are not more conscious than the blind person is. Similarly, someone in a state of normal alert
wakefulness might be conscious of more than someone who is mildly sedated, but they are not
thereby more conscious.
One might respond to the foregoing by suggesting that the notion of a level of consciousness
should be understood in terms of the degree to which local contents (rather than global states)
are conscious [4]. In our view, this strategy is no more promising than the standard treatment of
levels. Not only is it controversial whether the contents of consciousness can be graded in terms
of their degree of consciousness, equating a creature's level of consciousness with the ‘clarity’ of
its most conscious contents fails to capture the notion of a conscious level as it is actually
understood but at best introduces a novel construct into the debate (Box 2).
The second problem with the level-based analysis of global states is that there is good reason to
doubt whether all global states can be assigned a determinate ordering relative to each other.
Consider the relationship between the global conscious state associated with rapid eye
movement (REM) sleep and that which is associated with light levels of sedation. Although
the level-based analysis entails that one of these states must be absolutely ‘higher’ than the
other, we see no reason to grant that claim. Perhaps states can be compared with each other
only relative to certain dimensions of analysis: the global state associated with REM sleep might
be higher than that associated with sedation on some dimensions of analysis, whereas the
opposite might be the case on other dimensions of analysis (Figure 1A). Consider the following
Box 2. Graded Consciousness?
Some theorists have suggested that the notion of a conscious level should be understood in terms of the degree to which
local contents (rather than global states) are conscious (e.g., [4]). This proposal presupposes that some contents are
highly conscious (and are thus experienced as ‘clear and distinct’), whereas other contents enjoy only low levels of
consciousness (and are thus experienced as ‘degraded’ or ‘vague’) [44,45]. A creature's level of consciousness is then
equated with how conscious its most conscious contents are.
There are two main problems with this proposal. Firstly, it is controversial whether contents can be graded in this way. In
our view, reports of ‘degraded’ or ‘vague’ perception can be accounted for without supposing that consciousness itself is
graded. One possibility is that when subjects report ‘intermediate’ levels of awareness they mean only to be expressing
uncertainty about whether or not they saw the stimulus. Indeed, such an interpretation is highly plausible given the
epistemic terms in which the various response categories are described. (For example, the category of an almost clear
experience is explained in terms of a ‘feeling of having seen the stimulus, but being only somewhat sure about it’.) A
second possibility is that subjects are reporting the amount of information they take themselves to have about the
stimulus. For example, they might understand the difference between a clear experience and an experience that is almost
clear in terms of the difference between having a ﬁne-grained perception of the stimulus and having a coarse-grained
perception of it. This is certainly a legitimate contrast, but it has nothing to do with degrees of consciousness. There is,
however, ongoing and lively debate about this and other approaches to degrees of conscious content (see, e.g., [46–49])
Setting aside our concerns about whether contents can be graded in terms of their degree of consciousness, we doubt
whether a creature's level of consciousness should be equated with how conscious its most conscious contents are.
This account entails that a VS patient with even a single ‘clear and distinct’ experience of pain has the same level of
consciousness as any other individual with a ‘clear and distinct’ experience of pain. In our view this consequence is highly
problematic, for patients are not assigned to a particular level of consciousness on the basis of the clarity and distinctness
of their most conscious content. We conclude that this proposal does not capture the notion of a conscious level as it is
employed in the science of consciousness.
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analogy. The Chinese economy might be healthier than the Brazilian economy on some
dimensions, whereas the opposite might be the case when other dimensions are considered.
Is there any sense in which one of these two economies is all-things-considered healthier than
the other? Perhaps not. Attempts to impose an absolute ordering on global states of con-
sciousness may be as futile as attempts to impose such an ordering on economies.
The lesson to be drawn from the foregoing is that although the notion of a conscious level serves
a useful heuristic function insofar as it draws attention to certain relations between global
conscious states, it should not be treated as a legitimate theoretical construct in the science
of consciousness. Attempts to model global states of consciousness in one-dimensional terms
are no more plausible than attempts to model (say) intelligence in one-dimensional terms. Just as
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Figure 1. Conceptual Sketch of Multidimensional Global States of Consciousness. The radar charts depict regions in a multidimensional space that reﬂect
different states of consciousness. Numbers at the radii are placeholders for the dimensions of consciousness, they may correspond to a family of content-related (e.g.,
content gating and content range) and functional dimensions (e.g., relating to attentional control, memory consolidation, verbal report, reasoning, action selection, etc.).
The ﬁgures here do not portray empirically grounded results but are merely illustrative of possible dimensional analyses of states of consciousness. For further discussion,
see main text. (A) Global states may not possess an absolute ordering if they differ in different dimensions; for example, rapid eye movement (REM) dreaming and mild
sedation could be high and low in roughly opposite dimensions. (B) Multidimensionality raises the possibility of considerable variability within categories that are currently
assumed to involve a single global state of consciousness; for example, the global conscious states of certain MCS patients might resemble those of certain VS or EMCS
patients more closely than they do other MCS patients. (C) Interactions between dimensions may lead to non-linear transitions between states, raising the possibility of
regions that cannot be occupied; for example, for the difference between VS and MCS, it could be that being low in one dimension forces a low score in another
dimension, ruling out certain intermediate states. (D) The traditional two-dimensional representation of consciousness (e.g., [1,41]), which obscures scenarios such as
those represented by (A–C) and discussed in the main text. Reproduced from [1].
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multiple dimensions of analysis are needed in order to account for the various ways in which
intelligence is manifest in astronomy, architecture, and arithmetic, so too multiple dimensions of
analysis are needed to capture the various ways in which consciousness is manifest in different
global states. We turn now to consider what some of these dimensions might be.
Global States: Content-related Dimensions
Providing an account of the dimensions that are needed to model global states of conscious-
ness requires a much more detailed understanding of consciousness than that which we
currently possess. At present we can only sketch two of the many dimensions – or perhaps
families of dimensions – that structure global states. Filling in the details of this sketch will require
a signiﬁcant research project.
The ﬁrst of these two dimensions concerns the contents of consciousness. Although global
states of consciousness are distinct from local, content-involving states, it is likely that some of
the dimensions in terms of which global states can be modelled involve relations to conscious
contents. In particular, we suggest that global states differ from each other in terms of how they
gate conscious content. Normal waking experience allows for a wide range of contents to enter
consciousness. In addition to the ‘low-level’ features of objects such as their colour, motion,
texture, pitch, and so on, one can also be conscious of many of their high-level features. We see
chairs as chairs, taste coffee as coffee, and hear police sirens as police sirens; we also have
various capacities for conscious thought. However, in many global states the contents of
consciousness appear to be gated in various ways, with the result that individuals are able
to experience only a restricted range of contents. MCS patients, patients undergoing absence
seizures, and mildly sedated individuals can consciously represent the low-level features of
objects, but they are typically unable to represent the categories to which perceptual objects
belong, nor are they typically able to entertain complex thoughts about them. For example, an
MCS patient might be aware of motion, but be unable to recognise the moving object as the kind
of object it is.
Variation in the gating of conscious contents is likely to provide one dimension along which
certain global states can be hierarchically organised. For example, one can distinguish post-
coma patients who produce no fMRI response to spoken speech from patients who respond
to speech more than to other non-speech sounds, and from patients who respond to the
meaning of the speech itself [25]. Similarly, at low levels of sedation the awareness of low-level
auditory properties of speech is retained but the awareness of high-level semantic properties
(such as ambiguity) is lost, whereas the awareness of both low-level and high-level properties
is lost at higher levels of sedation [26]. Thus, one can order these patients in terms of a
content-based dimension of analysis. Note, however, that this result is in no way an exoner-
ation of the level-based account of global states. For one thing, it does not entail that all global
states can be ordered with respect to the ways in which contents are gated. In addition, this
ordering applies only to this content-related dimension, and it is entirely possible that these
same patients will be ordered in very different ways when other dimensions of analysis are
taken into consideration. We turn now to consider one such dimension: the functional
dimension.
Global States: Functional Dimensions
Consciousness is associated with various forms of cognitive and behavioural control. In ordinary
waking awareness the contents of consciousness are typically available to guide a wide range of
cognitive and behavioural processes, such as those involved in verbal report, intentional agency,
attentional control, reasoning, executive processing, memory consolidation, and so on. This
facet of consciousness is often captured by saying that the contents of consciousness are
globally available for the control of thought and action.
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Although global availability is sometimes taken to be an essential feature of consciousness
[27–29], there is good reason to think that it is compromised in a number of pathologies of
consciousness (that is, pathologies in which consciousness is presumed not to be totally
absent). For example, patients undergoing absence seizures can engage in perceptual-driven
motor responses even though their capacities for reasoning, executive processing, and
memory consolidation are typically limited [30–32]. Similarly, mildly sedated patients can
engage in some kinds of cognitions and behaviours but not others [33,34]. Of course, as
the literature on post-comatose disorders of consciousness attests [35–39], it can be difﬁcult
to tell whether an individual is completely unconscious or whether they are in a state of
consciousness in which many of the cognitive and behavioural systems associated with
consciousness are ‘off-line’ (Box 3).
The fact that cognitive and behavioural control can fragment in these ways provides us with
another dimension – or, perhaps, family of dimensions – for modelling consciousness, for certain
cognitive and behavioural capacities are more preserved in some global states of consciousness
than others. With respect to this dimension, the global state of consciousness associated with
the EMCS is ‘higher’ than that which is associated with the MCS, for EMCS patients have access
to a wider range of cognitive and behavioural consuming systems than MCS patients do.
Note, again, that nothing in the foregoing exonerates the level-based analysis of global states.
For one thing, appeals to functionality might enable us to order only some global states with
respect to each other. In particular, it is possible that there are two global states which both
exhibit functional impairments, but where there is no sense in which the functional impair-
ments is worse in one of the two states than in the other. (Consider, for example, the fact that
certain post-comatose patients can imagine playing tennis on command but cannot imagine
moving around their house, whereas other patients can imagine moving around their house
but cannot imagine playing tennis on command [35]). Secondly, even when global conscious
states can be ordered relative to a certain dimension of functionality, it is a further question
whether this ordering reﬂects their absolute relations, or whether it applies only to this
dimension of analysis.
From Levels to Multidimensional States
We can now begin to see what an alternative to the level-based conception of global conscious
states might look like. The central idea is that global states can be thought of as regions within a
multidimensional state space (Figure 1). Although the dimensions of the state space are still
unknown, we have suggested that one dimension tracks the gating of contents and another
Box 3. Levels and the Detection of Consciousness
The report-based methods for measuring consciousness employed in dealing with cognitively intact adult human beings
in a state of alert wakefulness can be used only with difﬁculty (if at all) in contexts involving impaired states of
consciousness. Thus, measuring consciousness in such contexts requires non-report-based methods. One alternative
to reports appeals to the capacity to produce responses to command. This capacity is often used to probe for
consciousness in post-comatose patients, anaesthesia, and (more controversially) epileptic absence seizures. Com-
mand-following has traditionally been probed by examining overt behaviour, but we can now probe command-following
by using fMRI and electroencephalography (EEG) to detect covert command-following – that is, command-following that
is not behaviourally manifest [50]. Other proposed measures of consciousness include the capacity to follow the plot of a
movie [51,52], and the representation of violations of global regularities [53].
In attempting to validate these novel measures of consciousness we face the following dilemma. On the one hand, we
should not restrict our measures of consciousness to processes that require high-level cognition, for taking conscious-
ness to require high-level cognition risks withholding ascriptions of consciousness to creatures who are in impaired global
states of consciousness. On the other hand, anything less than high-level cognitive access will not be regarded as
compelling evidence of consciousness. Finding a way between the two horns of this dilemma remains an ongoing
challenge for the science of consciousness [36,54,55].
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dimension (or family of dimensions) tracks the functional capacities associated with
consciousness.
The foregoing prompts a number of questions, the most pressing of which concerns the nature
of the dimensions that structure global states. In addition to gating, might other content-related
dimensions have a role to play here? Might there be a role for attention in structuring global
states? Do different types of functional capacities structure consciousness in different ways? For
example, do the functional capacities related to mind-wandering and endogenous cognitive
control correspond to one dimension whilst those relating to exogenous cognitive control
correspond to another dimension?
A second question concerns the relationship between our current ways of taxonomising global
states and the picture of consciousness that emerges from the multidimensional approach
(Figure 1B). At present, theorists tend to assume that one global state (or ‘level’) corresponds to
the MCS, another corresponds to EMCS, a third corresponds to REM dreaming, and so on. The
reality, of course, is likely to be signiﬁcantly messier [38,40]. Perhaps the global states of
consciousness associated with patients correctly categorised as MCS are heterogeneous, with
the global states of some MCS patients resembling those associated with certain (say) VS and
EMCS patients more than they do other MCS patients. The global states of consciousness
associated with sedation might also turn out to be very heterogeneous, and perhaps differ
depending on the sedative used. In other words, the multidimensional account might reveal
variation within our current categories that has gone unrecognised. It might also reveal com-
monalities between our current categories that have also gone unrecognised. We can ask how
closely related the global state(s) associated with REM dreaming are to those that are associated
with light levels of ketamine-induced sedation, or how closely related the global state(s)
associated with the waking MCS patients are to those that are associated with light levels
of propofol-induced sedation. The cartography of consciousness that is likely to emerge from
addressing these questions may look very different from that which is currently assumed in
consciousness science (Figure 1D).
A third question concerns the possibility of interaction between some of the dimensions that
structure consciousness. Although some dimensions may be completely independent of each
other, others are likely to modulate each other, with the result that certain regions in this
multidimensional space will be empty (or at least, inaccessible to creatures like us). For example,
there might be interactions between the gating of contents and functionality such that con-
sciousness cannot be high on the gating dimension but low on certain dimensions of function-
ality (Figure 1C).
If there are such interactions how might they be explained? It is natural to appeal to arousal at this
point. Arousal is often mentioned in connection with global states of consciousness, and indeed
many authors come close to equating global states of consciousness with states of arousal (see,
e.g., [1,41]). But any discussion of arousal in connection with global states of consciousness
must proceed with caution. VS patients can have high levels of arousal but they are typically
unconscious (and thus have no level of consciousness). By contrast, in the widely reported
phenomenon of anaesthetic awareness [11,34], patients have a high level of consciousness
despite the fact that standard physiological measures of arousal are low. The relationship
between global states of consciousness and arousal is multifaceted, in part because the notion
of arousal is itself multifaceted. If arousal is conceptualised in behavioural terms then it might
function as one dimension along which global states differ. If, however, it is conceptualised in
neuroanatomical terms – for example, in terms of activity in the brainstem ‘arousal system’ – then
it might function as a common cause of variation in multiple dimensions of consciousness and in
so doing provide a partial explanation of certain aspects of global states of consciousness.
Trends in Cognitive Sciences, June 2016, Vol. 20, No. 6 411
The existence of interactions between various dimensions might account for many of the
intuitions that underpin the widespread appeal of the level-based conception of global states.
For example, if it turns out that consciousness (where it occurs) in the VS is both more strongly
gated and more functionally impoverished than consciousness in the MCS, then there would be
a clear sense in which the global state of consciousness associated with the VS is ‘lower’ than
that which is associated with the MCS (Figure 1C). Similarly, if it turns out that consciousness at
low levels of sedation is less strongly gated and less functionally impoverished than conscious-
ness at higher levels of sedation (as is very plausibly the case), then it would also follow that the
global state of consciousness associated with low levels of sedation is ‘higher’ than that which is
associated with higher levels of sedation. But although the multidimensional account might
vindicate a number of the intuitions that motivate the levels-based approach, it is clearly at odds
with the central tenets of the view.
Concluding Remarks
As the science of consciousness matures it is increasingly in need of constructs to guide
research and theorising. Our central aim in this paper has been to argue that the notion of a level
of consciousness is ill-suited for this function, for it implies that global states of consciousness
can be ordered in terms of a single dimension – an implication that we have argued is at best
uncertain and at worst false. Global states of consciousness, we have argued, are best
understood as regions in a multidimensional space. The task of identifying the dimensions of
this space is an urgent and necessary one that will lead ultimately to a better understanding of
consciousness itself (see Outstanding Questions).
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